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INTERNATIONAL LAW-TREATIES-INHERITANCE RIGHTS oF R.Esx-
DENTS OF YucosLAVIA-All the heirs at law of a Pennsylvania resident who 
died intestate resided in Yugoslavia. The Orphans' Court found that the 
distributees would not have the actual benefit, use, enjoyment or control 
of their intestate shares. In accordance with a state statute providing for 
such contingency,1 the funds were ordered paid, without escheat, into the 
state treasury. On appeal, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting. Because 
the statute is custodial rather than confiscatory, it is not repugnant to the 
most-favored-nation clause of the treaty between the United States and 
Yugoslavia which provides for reciprocal rights of inheritance between 
citizens of the two nations. In re Belemechich's Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 192 
A.2d 740 (1963), rev'd per curiam sub nom. 'Consul General of Yugoslavia 
v. Pennsylvania, 375 U.S. 395 (1964). 
By customary international law, aliens have no right to inherit 
property.2 The individual states in the United States have traditionally 
been regarded as having the dominant interest in determining the extent 
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1155-59 (Supp. 1962). Two alternatives are provided when 
it appears to the court that the distributee would not have the use of the property: (a) 
to make payments in such manner and amounts as the court may deem proper, or (b) 
to withhold distribution, convert the share into cash, and pay it into the state treasury 
without escheat. 
2 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 290 (1940); 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW§ 203 (2d ed. 1945); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW§ 321 (8th ed. 1955). 
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"to which aliens can inherit property within their jurisdiction.8 This power 
has so far been restricted only hy the exercise of the federal treaty power.• 
A number of states have limited the right of aliens residing in "Iron 
Curtain" countries to inherit property of which the state has jurisdiction.15 
This legislation has followed one of two basic patterns. The first, "reciprocal 
rights" legislation, provides for escheat of property which would· otherwise 
pass to citizens of a foreign country if that country's inheritance laws 
discriminate against heirs in America.6 The second, "benefit rule" legisla-
tion of the type involved in the principal case, provides that nonresident 
alien heirs must prove that they will receive the benefit, use, enjoyment, or 
control of the property before the state will release it to them.7 
In the leading case of Clark v. Allen,8 the United States Supreme Court 
summarily dismissed the argument that reciprocal rights laws are uncon-
stitutional as an infringement on the exclusive federal power over foreign 
affairs.9 In a recent case involving benefit rule legislation, however, two 
Justices dissented from a decision dismissing an appeal for lack of a 
substantial federal question.10 They argued that if the purpose of such 
statutes is to preclude unfriendly governments from obtaining funds, as 
it appears to be,11 this would seemingly be an unlawful attempt to regulate 
foreign affairs.12 The practical impact of these statutes on foreign affairs 
has changed since Clark,13 and there are some indications that the attitude 
3 Boyd, Treaties Governing the Succession to Real Property by Aliens, 51 MICH. L. 
REv. 1001 (1953). 
4 Id. at 1005. 
5 Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and Its Satellites to Shares in Estates 
of American Decedents, 25 So. CAL. L. REv. 297 (1952). In most states, such legislation was 
originally passed in response to the menace of Nazi Germany, and is not limited in its 
terms to Iron Curtain countries. Id. at 298. 
6 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CoDE § 259; ORE. REv. STAT. § 111.070 (1951). These statutes 
cast the burden of proof of reciprocity on the alien heir. Chaitkin, supra note 5, at 307. 
Conceivably, therefore, these statutes could work an injustice even on citizens of friendly 
countries. See id. at 317. 
7 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.28 (Supp. 1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 161 (1961); MASS. 
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 206, § 27B (Supp. 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:25-10 (1953); N.Y. SuRR. 
CT. ACT § 269; Omo REv. CODE § 2113.81 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1156 (Supp. 
1962); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-13-13 (1956); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 318.06(8) (1958). 
s 331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
9 Id. at 504. 
10 Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting in Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30 (1962). 
11 See, e.g., Boyd, The Invalidity of State Statutes Governing the Shares of Non-
resident Aliens in Decedents' Estates, 51 GEo. L.J. 470, 488 (1963). The argument is some-
times advanced that decedents' intentions are effectuated by the statutes. Id. at 487. Some 
writers feel, however, that these statutes usually defeat the decedent's intention. See, e.g., 
Heyman, The Nonresident Alien's Right to Succession Under the "Iron Curtain Rule," 
52 Nw. U.L. REv. 221, 236 (1957). Other writers have attacked the underlying assumption 
of the statutes, for they feel that Soviet heirs do in fact receive the benefit of foreign 
distributions. See, e.g., Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 257, 
263 (1962). 
12 Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30, 34 (1962). 
13 Increasing capital emigration and growing national interest in foreign investment 
have changed the problem from one primarily of aliens seeking property rights in the 
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toward the magnitude of that impact has also changed.14 Nevertheless, it 
is impossible to predict whether these considerations will eventually bring 
about a reversal of Clark, and, at least by implication, benefit rule legisla-
tion would seem to be secure for the present from attack on constitutional 
grounds.lG 
In determining in the principal case that the heirs would not have the 
actual benefit or control of the decedent's estate, the court relied heavily 
upon an extraordinary use of judicial notice of conditions in Yugoslavia.16 
Other courts, however, have determined this question by relying principally 
on previous judicial decisions and on official federal publications defining 
federal policies.17 With respect to Yugoslavia, two lower Pennsylvania 
courts had previously determined that a Yugoslavian heir would receive 
the benefit of his share.18 Moreover, Treasury Department regulations, 
and State Department reliance upon them, seem to reflect a federal deter-
mination that funds will reach their destination in Yugoslavia.19 The 
decision in the principal case, therefore, seems to be a deviation from the 
established pattern of decision in this area. 
It is elementary that a state statute cannot be given effect if it conflicts 
United States to one of Americans seeking property rights in foreign countries. Boyd, 
supra note 11, at 514. 
14 Ibid. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinion for 
the Court in Clark, also wrote the dissent in Ioannou. The State Department has found 
the administration of the benefit rule statutes to be a constant source of embarrassment. 
See Heyman, supra note 11, at 237. 
111 See notes 9·10 supra and accompanying text. 
16 See principal case at 509, 192 A.2d at 742. Several other courts have employed this 
technique. See Heyman, supra note 11, at 233. Generally, only when a matter is not 
disputable, and is well established and authoritatively settled, can it properly be a matter 
of judicial notice. 20 AM. JUR. Evidence § 19 (1939). The unusual employment of judicial 
notice in this area has been prompted in large part by the difficulty of obtaining evidence 
and by a desire to prevent the determination from becoming a battle of experts. Snyder 
&: Stander, Distributive Rights of Foreign Beneficiaries as Affected by State Action-Re-
cent Pennsylvania Developments, 63 DICK. L. R.Ev. 297, 307 (1959). However, in In re 
Zupko's Estate, 15 Pa. D. &: C.2d 442 (Orphans' Ct. 1958), the court compiled over 400 
pages of expert testimony, intending that it be employed in similar cases. Use of such 
testimony, supplemented periodically, would seem to obviate the necessity for any 
haphazard use of judicial notice in the sensitive area of foreign relations. 
17 Note, 36 TUL. L. R.Ev. 799, 809 (1962). Courts have often relied on 31 C.F.R. 
§ 211.ll(a) (Cum. Supp. 1963), which lists the countries in which there is not a reasonable 
assurance that a payee of a check drawn in the United States will be able to negotiate it 
for full value. See, e.g., In re Braier, 305 N.Y. 148, 157, 111 N.E.2d 424, 428 (1953). The 
New York courts immediately began to distribute funds to Polish distributees when that 
country was removed from the list. See In Te Doktor's Will, 18 Misc. 2d 223, 183 N.Y.S.2d 
60 (Surr. Ct. 1959). 
18 See In re Aras' Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 635 (Orphans' Ct. 1960); In Te Piscak's 
Estate, 108 Prrr. LEG. J. 309 (Allegheny County Orphans' Ct. 1960). 
19 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 211.3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1963). For examples of cases in which 
courts relied on letters from the State Department which apparently adopted the policies 
of this regulation, see, e.g., Petition of Mazurowski, 331 Mass. 33, 38, 116 N.E.2d 854, 858 
(1954); Estate of Markewitsh, 62 N.J. Super. 407, 409, 163 A.2d 232, 233 (Passaic County 
Ct. 1960). 
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with a federal treaty.20 In reversing the principal case, the United States 
Supreme Court apparently found that the Pennsylvania statute, although 
custodial, violated a treaty of 1881 between the United States and Serbia,21 
as that treaty had been interpreted by the Court in the recent case of Kolovrat 
v. Oregon.22 This treaty is recognized by the federal government as being 
currently in force with Yugoslavia, successor sovereign of Serbia.28 Article 
II of this self-executing treaty24 provides for unconditional most-favored-
nation treatment of inheritance rights.25 An unconditional most-favored-
nation clause in a treaty grants to each signatory nation the broadest rights 
and privileges which the other nation grants by any present or future 
treaty.26 Most significant to the present case is a treaty of 1853 between 
the United States and Argentina.27 Article IX of that treaty provides for 
very broad reciprocal rights of inheritance on the same basis and in the 
same manner as native citizens.28 In Kolovrat, the Supreme Court stated 
that the provisions of the Argentine treaty are incorporated into the 
Serbian treaty, and that the inheritance rights of citizens of Yugoslavia are 
consequently to be identical with those of American citizens.29 
This construction of the 1881 Serbian treaty is also strongly supported 
by traditional judicial methods of treaty interpretation. In addition to a 
marked tendency to overrule any state law inimical to the general purpose 
of a treaty,80 American courts have long recognized and employed the 
20 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 
483 (1879). 
21 Treaty With Serbia for Facilitating and Developing Commercial Relations, Oct. 14 
1881, 22 Stat. 963, T.S. No. 319. 
22 366 U.S. 187 (1961). A possible second ground for the Kolovrat decision, that a 
reciprocal rights statute violates federal foreign policy as expressed in the International 
Monetary Fund Agreement, although having wide implications, would not control the 
principal case, since the benefit rule is not concerned solely with the exchange rates. 
23 See Settlement of Pecuniary Claims Against Yugoslavia .Agreement With Yugoslavia, 
July 19, 1948, art. V, 62 Stat. 2658, T.I.A.S. No. 1803. For the official United States attitude 
toward the continuing effect of the treaty as to property rights, see Myers, Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 150 (1961). 
24 Treaties giving aliens the right to inherit have always been held self-executing. 
Henry, When Is a Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MICH. L. REv. 776, 781 (1929). 
25 "Article II. In all that concerns the right of acquiring, possessing or disposing of 
every kind of property, real or personal, citizens of the United States in Serbia and Serbian 
subjects in the United States, shall enjoy the rights which the respective laws grant or 
shall grant in each of these states to the subjects of the most favored nation." For a view 
that this article provides unconditional most-favored-nation treatment, see Kolovrat v. 
Oregon, 365 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); Meekison, Treaty Provisions for the Inheritance of 
Personal Property, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 314 (1959). 
26 See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 365 U.S. 187, 193 (1951). 
27 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, With the Argentine Confedera-
tion, July 27, 1853, 10 Stat. 1005, T.S. No. 4. 
28 "In whatever relates to •.• acquiring and disposing of property of every sort and 
denomination, either by sale, donation, exchange, testament, or in any other manne1 
whatsoever, ..• the citizens of the two contracting parties shall reciprocally enjoy the 
same privileges, liberties, and rights, as native citizens .••• " Ibid. 
29 365 U.S. 187, 191 (1961). 
ao See, e.g., Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 125 
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doctrine favoring liberal construction of treaties.31 This doctrine was 
applied in Kolovrat in interpreting the scope of the Serbian treaty broadly.32 
Seemingly, its application here would dictate absolutely equal rights with 
American citizens, a reasonable as well as possible reading of the treaty. 
Moreover, courts usually give considerable weight, though not controlling 
influence, to the construction placed upon a treaty by the political depart-
ment of the federal government.33 Federal interpretation clearly recognizes 
that inheritance rights are reciprocal without regard to domicile.34 Further, 
the objectives of the parties in negotiating a treaty are often relied upon by 
a court in interpreting the treaty.35 Specific provisions of the Serbian 
treaty,30 as well as the history of the negotiations,37 definitely indicates a 
desire to facilitate the most liberal sort of exchange between the two 
nations. 
Residents of Pennsylvania do not have to prove that they will "hear the 
merry jingle in their pockets of the money left them"38 before being 
entitled to receive it.39 By establishing such a requirement for alien heirs, 
however, the Pennsylvania benefit rule statute clearly treats Yugoslavian 
heirs differently from American heirs. Although a custodial statute is 
certainly less harsh than a confiscatory one,40 and theoretically may be 
termed procedural as compared to the clearly substantive reciprocal rights 
statutes,41 the practical result may equally be the eventual loss of the 
property to the Yugoslavian heir. A drastic change in Yugoslavian policies 
(1928). See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 
U.S. 324 (1937). 
81 See, e.g., Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940); Jordan v. Tashiro, 
278 U.S. 123, 128 (1928). 
32 866 U.S. 187, 194 (1961). 
33 Meekison, supra note 25, at 326. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 
294 (1933); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197,223 (1923). 
34 See S. REP. No. 800, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1950). 
35 CHANG, THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES BY JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS 181 (1933). 
36 The commercial relations established between the two nations, facilitated by the 
freedom of residency of citizens in each other's territory, would be seriously hampered if 
one accumulating property were denied the gratification of leaving the property to whom 
he pleased. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); Santovicenzo v. Egan, 284 
U.S. 30, 37 (1931). 
37 The 1881 treaty was one of a series of treaties negotiated with the purpose of 
obtaining reciprocal national treatment for property rights. See, e.g., Report on Negotia-
tions dated Nov. 30, 1850, 5 MILLER, TREATIES AND OTHER INTER.NATIONAL Acrs OF THE 
UNITED STATES 861 (1937); D.S. 15 Instructions, Argentina, 19-26, 6 MILLER, op. cit. supra 
at 219. 
38 Principal case at 512, 192 A.2d at 743. 
30 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1156 (Supp. 1962). 
40 Especially is this true of the Pennsylvania statute, which provides 2% interest per 
annum on funds held in custody. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1158 (Supp. 1962). 
41 Snyder & Stander, supra note 16, at 301. Alternative (a) of the Pennsylvania statute 
summarized in note 1 supra, is even more clearly procedural than alternative (b), which 
was used by the court in the principal case. But alternative (a) also treats Yugoslavian 
heirs differently, limiting the right to immediate possession which the heir would have if 
an American. 
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can not be reliably predicted for the foreseeable future. Inevitably claims 
will be forgotten,42 or the difficulty of proof will become insurmountable 
for the claiming distributee.43 Regardless of these practical effects, however, 
the statute clearly discriminates against alien heirs.44 Because such dis-
crimination in relation to Yugoslavian heirs violates the equal treatment 
guaranteed them under the 1881 treaty,415 the Supreme Court was un-
doubtedly correct in reversing the decision of the Pennsylvania high court, 
Having been decided on these narrower grounds, however, the principal 
case failed to provide an opportunity for attacking all state alien succession 
statutes on broader constitutional grounds, a problem which may be 
expected to arise in the course of future litigation. 
Charles F. Niemeth 
42 Attempts to circumvent the benefit rule statutes have not been successful. The 
courts have refused to honor assignments of the rights of alien distributees even to per-
sons who certainly would receive the benefit of the distribution. See, e.g., In re Geiger's 
Estate, 12 Misc. 2d 1043, 175 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Surr. Ct. 1958); In re Perlinsky's Estate, 202 
Misc. 351, 115 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Surr. Ct. 1952). 
43 Before custody of the property will be given to the distributee, he must provide 
"proof to the satisfaction of the court of the petitioner's ownership of such money and 
that he will have the actual possession, benefit, use, enjoyment or control, thereof." PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1158 (Supp. 1962). 
44 Besides the obvious discrimination in withholding distribution from the Yugosla-
vian heirs, consider the additional discriminations possible in alternative (b) of the Penn-
sylvania statute, summarized in note 1 supra. Land, or a family heirloom, descending to 
a Yugoslavian resident, will be converted into cash. This will be not only a loss of a valued 
family possession, but likely a financial loss as well. 
45 See notes 29-80, 34, 36-37, 39 supra and accompanying text. 
